Séminaire de philosophie médiévale “Le Temps”
org. J.-B. Brenet & V. Decaix
Univ. Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Gramata, avec le soutien de l’IUF
Ockham on Time
Cecilia Trifogli (All Souls College, Oxford)
Mardi 29 mars 2022 – 17h-19h – BIS, salle de formation
It is not surprising that Ockham’s position on time is a reductionist one. In my paper I will present the specific nature of Ockham’s reductionism, setting it in its relevant medieval context. The main ingredient of this context is the issue of the distinction between permanent and successive things. Permanent things are those the parts of which can all exist at the same time, whereas successive things are those the parts of which can only exist one after another in time. Time, together with change, is classified as a successive thing. What is matter of debate is the ontological status of successive things. Medieval realists (for example, Walter Burley, Ockham’s fiercest enemy) maintain that successive things are distinct from and not reducible to permanent things. Some of them also argue that change and time are two distinct and irreducible successive things. Ockham denies both the claim that successive things are distinct from permanent things and the claim that change and time are two distinct (successive) things. In his view, both change and time are reducible to permanent things and to the same set of permanent things, so that there is not a mind-independent distinction between change and time.
Réservation obligatoire en contactant Véronique Decaix ou Jean-Baptiste Brenet.
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parimed (2022, 15 février). 29 mars 2022 – Séance de séminaire – Cecilia Trifogli “Ockham on Time” Pariscope médiéval. Consulté le 22 février 2024, à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/sopb